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I use a question about works council relations from the 2006 wave of the IAB Establishment 
panel to analyze the heterogeneous effects of works councils on productivity, wages, and 
profits. The results indicate that the effects differ significantly between works council 
relationship types in a systematic pattern. The overall findings are in line with productivity-
enhancing and rent-sharing functions of works councils. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last two decades, many empirical studies have been conducted that analyze the 
economic consequences of works councils in German firms (for detailed literature 
reviews see Frege (2002), Addison, Schnabel and Wagner (2001; 2004), Jirjahn (2005; 
2006), and articles by Jirjahn (2011) and Mueller (2011) in this special issue). Most of 
these studies use the IAB Establishment Panel or the Hannover Firm Panel and compare 
firms with and without works councils. The findings are mostly in line with theoretical 
considerations about productivity-enhancing and rent-sharing functions of works 
councils (Freeman and Lazear, 1995; Hübler and Jirjahn, 2003). For example, most 
studies report positive or at least non-negative effects of works councils on firms' labor 
productivity, positive effects on workers' wages, and negative or non-significant effects 
on profits. 
One shortcoming of previous econometric studies is that they only look at the existence 
of a works council, but cannot look into the black box of works council-management-
relations due to data limitations. The pioneering study of works council typology by 
Kotthoff (1981; 1994) follows a case study approach to analyze the social relationships 
between works councils and management in 63 German firms. Although Kotthoff does 
not explicitly analyze the economic consequences of different works council types, his 
study is important because it distinguishes between effective and ineffective works 
councils in terms of interest representation. Most firms in Kotthoff's sample have 
ineffective works councils that can be characterized as ignored by management or 
workers, as isolated by an authoritarian management, or as part of the management. On 
the other hand, effective works councils are characterized as respected regulators, as 
respected surveillance, or as cooperative counter-power. Nienhüser (2005) uses data 3 
 
from a telephone survey with HR officers in firms that have a works council. He 
identifies four types of works councils along the two dimensions bargaining power and 
willingness to cooperate and examines their impact on firm-level bargaining 
agreements. A recent study by Jirjahn, Mohrenweiser, and Backes-Gellner (2009) uses a 
small works council survey to analyze the determinants of bad works council relations 
as perceived by management. Their main focus is on learning dynamics; economic 
consequences of works council relations are not considered.  
An exception in the evaluation of economic consequences of works council types are 
studies by Dilger (2002; 2006). Dilger connects data from the NIFA-Panel with the 
Bochumer Survey of Works Councils. He uses perceptions of the relationship between 
management and works councils by both sides to identify different types such as 
antagonistic or cooperative works councils. The findings indicate that the effects of 
these works council types on labor turnover, flexible working time arrangements, 
product innovations, and profit situation differ significantly in size. For example, the 
cooperative type and a more positive perception of works council-management-relations 
reduces labor turnover by most.  
In this paper, I use  a question about works council relations from the 2006 wave of the 
large-scale IAB Establishment Panel to analyze the heterogeneous effects of three 
works council types on economic outcomes such as labor productivity, wages, and 
profits. The main results are that the effects between the three works council types differ 
significantly in a systematic pattern, which is consistent with theoretical expectations of 
productivity-enhancing and rent-sharing effects of works council types. For example, 
more cooperative works councils have stronger positive effects on productivity and 
more bargaining works councils have stronger positive effects on wages. Because I use 4 
 
a sample of firms with and without works councils as well as firms with different works 
council types, the results are important for the economic consequences of works 
councils as a whole, which is most important for policy, and for the efficient 
organization of industrial relations on the firm level. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The data set and variables are 
described in Section 2. Section 3 presents the econometric results. The paper concludes 
with a short summary and discussion of the results in Section 4. 
 
2. Data and descriptive statistics 
The IAB Establishment Panel contains rich data on establishments from all sixteen 
German federal states (“Bundesländer”) and all industries (Kölling, 2000). Every year 
more than 15,000 firms with at least one employee covered by social security are 
interviewed in an unbalanced panel design survey. The sample is stratified according to 
ten establishment sizes and sixteen industries, with oversampling of larger firms. The 
observational unit is the establishment, i.e., the local unit in which major activities of an 
enterprise are carried out. Main concern of the survey is to gain insights into the firm’s 
most important parts of operation, decision-making, and more specifically employment. 
For the purpose of this study, I can only use the wave 2006 because it is the only year 
that contains a question about works council-management-relations. Since productivity 
and profit information are stated for the last business year, these economic outcome 
variables are taken from the wave 2007. Thus, firms in the estimation sample have to 
participate in surveys in both years 2006 and 2007. Further sample restrictions had to be 
applied. First, the sample includes only firms with at least five employees, because 5 
 
smaller firms do not need to establish works councils under the legislation of the Works 
Constitution Act ("Betriebsverfassungsgesetz"). Second, firms from agriculture, hotel, 
restaurant, education, health, social, non-profit, public, or financial sector are dropped, 
because they usually do not report profits or sales, which is important for the 
computation of the productivity variable. Third, only firms without missing values in 
the used variables are considered. Overall 4693 firms remain in my sample for the 
subsequent empirical analysis. 
The question about works council relations and the three possible answer categories, 
from which the explanatory variables of interests are generated, are worded as follows: 
How would you characterize the role of the works council in managerial decision 
making in your establishment? 
(1) Works council is in line with management in most decisions from the outset. 
   Type 1: "mostly in line with management" 
(2) Works council has often a different opinion, but in the end a consensus is 
reached. 
   Type 2: "different opinion but with consensus" 
(3) Decisions have often to be enforced against the works council. 
   Type 3: "different opinion without consensus" 
If the works council complies with most management decisions from the outset, this 
relationship type can have two reasons. One the one hand, the management decisions 
might take already employees' interests into account so that the works council must not 6 
 
disagree with management. On the other hand, a works council might be simply too 
weak to bargain with management or might follow own interests instead of representing 
the workforce interests. The second type describes works councils that express different 
employee opinions and bargain successfully with management so that a consensus is 
reached in most cases. The third type is mostly against decisions of the management and 
agreements between works council and management are seldom reached so that 
decisions have to be enforced against the works council. The three works council types 
can be broadly characterized along the two dimensions cooperation and bargaining. 
Type 1 and type 2 can be seen as cooperative, whereas type 3 is likely to show few 
interests in cooperation with management or at least is unsuccessful in finding a 
consensus. Furthermore, type 1 is probably not strongly engaged in bargaining activities 
with management, whereas type 2 and type 3 are likely to bargain more and harder with 
management; the former mostly with and the latter mostly without a consensus. Because 
cooperation has productivity-enhancing effects and bargaining is often associated with 
rent-sharing activities, the effects of the three works council types on productivity, 
wages, and profits are expected to differ between each other, i.e., a homogeneous works 
council effect is rather unlikely. 
Table 1 informs about the frequency of works councils and their relationship types. The 
incidence of works councils is about 31 percent among all firms in my sample. Almost 
three out of four firms with a works council judge their works council of type 2 
("different opinion but with consensus"), about 23 percent of type 1 ("mostly in line 
with management"), and less than 4 percent of type 3 ("different opinion without 
consensus"). Thus, the large majority of works councils has a rather cooperative 
relationship with firms' management. An important determinant of works council 7 
 
relations seems to be the existence of a union bargained collective contract. Split 
samples for firms with and without collective contracts show that type 2 is more likely 
if the firm is bound to a collective contract. A rationale for this finding might be that 
unions strengthen works councils (e.g., advisory, financial, and personnel capacity) in 
their position to bargain with a firm's management.  
insert Table 1 about here 
To estimate the economic consequences of the works council types, three outcome 
variables are used: productivity, wages, and profits. A firm's average labor productivity 
is proxied by the log value added per employee, which is sales minus inputs in the entire 
business year 2006 divided by the number of employees in June 2006. Firm's average 
wages are proxied by the log of total gross monthly salaries divided by the number of 
employees in June 2006. The data also includes the perceived profit situation in 2006, 
which could be answered on a five-point scale ranging from one for very good to five 
for very bad. In addition to this ordinal profit measure, a binary indicator for an at least 
good profit situation is generated. The basic econometric model looks as in equation (1), 
in which Y denotes the outcome variable (log productivity, log wages, good profit 
dummy, or ordinal profit situation), WC indicates the existence of a works council as 
well as the three works council types (reference group are firms without works 
councils), X includes a set of control variables (union contract, mainly foreign capital 
owner, firm founded before 1990, state of technology, average working time, 
employment shares of qualification groups, part-time, fixed-term contracts and females, 
number of employees and squared term, 9 industry dummies, 16 regional dummies), 
Greek letters indicate parameters to be estimated, ε the usual residual term, and i is a 
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insert Table 2 about here 
For productivity as well as wages, linear regressions can be applied, whereas ordered 
probit estimates are the appropriate estimation technique for the ordered profit outcome 
and binary probit estimates for the binary profit situation. In all estimates, 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are computed. Also note that, though effects of 
works councils on outcomes are discussed, the applied regression analyses estimate in 
principal only correlations, which are not necessarily causal effects due to unobserved 
heterogeneity and reverse causality issues. 
 
3. Econometric results 
Table 3 presents the regression results for the complete estimation sample. The linear 
regression results for productivity (log value added per employee) are displayed in the 
second column. Firms with a works council of type 1 ("mostly in line with 
management") have on average a significant larger productivity (about 20 percent) than 
firms without a works council; and firms with a works council of type 2 ("different 
opinion but with consensus") have an even larger productivity (about 40 percent).
1 
These findings are consistent with the consideration that cooperative works councils 
                                                 
1 To compute the percentage change in productivity and wages measured in Euros from OLS coefficients 
of log-linear functions, the subsequent formula is applied: (1 ) e
  . The estimated productivity effects of 
up to 40 percent are quite large but fall into the range of previous findings (e.g., Addison, Schnabel, and 
Wagner, 2004; Jirjahn, 2011; Mueller, 2011). 9 
 
have a productivity-enhancing effect. But to enhance productivity, an exchange of 
information between works council and management in bargaining processes seems to 
have an additional positive effect. Moreover, it is a remarkable result that the existence 
of a works council does not harm productivity even if management decisions have to 
enforced against the works council (type 3). The estimated coefficients indicate that 
firms with a works council of type 3 ("different opinion without consensus") are on 
average not less productive than firms without works councils. In fact, these firms have 
on average a productivity that is about 15 percent higher than in firms without works 
councils. The estimated effect for works councils of type 3 is however not statistically 
significant. The large standard error might be reasoned by effect heterogeneity, which 
can be seen in separate estimates for firms with and without collective contracts in the 
robustness section. 
insert Table 3 about here 
The estimated coefficients for the wage function (log total salaries per employee) in the 
third column show that wages are significant larger in firms with works councils. Wages 
in firms with a works council of type 1 ("mostly in line with management") are 
approximately 15 percent, in firms with a works council of type 2 ("different opinion 
but with consensus") approximately 17 percent, and in firms with a works council of 
type 3 ("different opinion without consensus") nearly 30 percent larger than in firms 
without works councils. The results are consistent with the rent-sharing function of 
works councils, i.e., works councils increase workers' share of the increased value 
added (Freeman and Lazear, 1995). That works councils of type 3 ("different opinion 
without consensus") have the largest effect on wages might be reasoned by strong works 
councils, which mostly care about income of workers and not about firm performance in 10 
 
the longer run. It seems however questionable why firms can afford to pay such high 
wages, although the productivity estimates have shown no significant productivity-
enhancing effect of this relationship type. An explanation might be that profits of capital 
owners are negatively affected, on which we focus in the next step. 
Table 3 also informs about the results of the binary probit estimates for an at least good 
profit situation (marginal effects in fourth column) and ordered probit estimates for five 
profit categories (very good, good, satisfactory, bad, very bad) (coefficients in fifth 
column and marginal effects for single outcomes in subsequent columns). Firms with a 
works council of type 1 ("mostly in line with management"), which might be 
cooperative but not very strong in bargaining worker interests, have no significant 
different profit situation than firms without works councils but a significant better profit 
situation than firms with the two other works council types. Firms with a works council 
of type 2 ("different opinion but with consensus") are on average significantly less 
likely to perceive their profit situation as good or very good. The effect of a works 
council of type 3 ("different opinion without consensus") on profits is also significant 
negative and even stronger than for type 2. The last finding is consistent with the above 
consideration that high wages in firms with works council type 3 are not explained by 
large productivity-enhancement but by large rent-sharing effects, which reduce firms' 
profits. 
The estimates in Table 3 reveal also some interesting results for the control variables. 
Union bargained collective contracts have only a significant effect in the ordered probit 
estimates for the perceived profit situation. Although only of weak significance, firms 
with collective contracts have a slightly better profit situation than firms without 
collective contracts. The dummy variable, which indicates if capital owners are mainly 11 
 
foreign, has significant effects in the productivity and wage regression but not in the 
profit regressions. Firms with mainly foreign capital owners have on average a 
productivity that is nearly 20 percent larger and wages that are nearly 10 percent larger 
than in other firms. Firms founded before the year 1990, i.e., which are at least 17 years 
old, have on average significant larger productivity and wages but a slightly worse 
profit situation than younger firms. The state of the technology has significant positive 
effects on productivity, wages, and perceived profit situation. The newer the 
technology, the larger are the effects.     
Some studies point out that results for works councils are not robust across different 
subsamples (e.g., Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner, 2004). Thus, I re-estimated the 
productivity, wage, and profit functions for different subsamples as a robustness check.
2 
First, I split the sample into firm size classes. The main results are robust. As an 
example, the results for the subsample of firms with 21 to 100 employees are presented 
in Table 4. Second, the sample is split into firms with and without union bargained 
collective contracts. The results are also presented in Table 4. Whereas the overall 
results are qualitatively identical, it can be seen that the productivity enhancing effect of 
works councils is larger in firms with a collective contract. This finding is consistent 
with previous studies and might be explained by the fact that some distributional 
conflicts are solved outside the firm in collective contracts which might encourage the 
works council to engage more in productivity-enhancing activities (Hübler and Jirjahn, 
2003). 
insert Table 4 about here 
                                                 




The combined effects of works councils on the three outcomes productivity, wages, and 
profits are consistent with theoretical expectations about productivity-enhancing and 
rent-sharing functions. The results might also explain why management has an interest 
in cooperative but weak works councils (better profit situation in firms with works 
councils of type 1), whereas workers and their representatives have preferences for 
strong works councils that bargain with management about higher wages. From a total 
welfare perspective bargaining and cooperative works councils (type 2) seem to be most 
desirable, because the positive productivity effects are the largest, while showing also 
significant positive effects on workers' income and moderate negative effects on firms' 
profits. One limitation of this paper, which has to be addressed in future research, is the 
causality of the effects, because my regression analysis has only estimated correlations 
in cross sectional data. Due to the systematic findings that concur with theory and 
intuition, it is however not unrealistic to assume that the overall findings might indeed 
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Tables to be inserted in text 
 
Table 1: Frequencies of works council relationship types 








Works council existence  31.39 (100)  13.31 (100)  49.89 (100) 
Type 1: "mostly in line with management"  7.35 (23.42)  3.96 (29.75)  10.82 (21.69) 
Type 2: "different opinion but with consensus"  22.97 (73.19)  9.01 (67.72)  37.26 (74.68) 
Type 3: "different opinion without consensus"  1.07 (3.39)  0.34 (2.53)  1.81 (3.63) 
Notes: Frequencies in percent. All four variables are dummies. The reference group for works council types is no 
works council so that the frequencies of the types sum up to the frequency of works council existence. The 
relative frequencies for firms with a works council are in parentheses. 







Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Mean Std.  Dev. Min.  Max. 
Economic outcome variables 
PROD: log productivity per employee (sales minus inputs 
divided by number of employees)  10.7360 0.8767  5.4146 14.3437 
WAGE: log wage per employee (total monthly salaries 
divided by number of employees)  7.4890  0.5489  4.8721  8.9120 
PROFIT_G: at least good profit situation (dummy)  0.4856  0.4998  0  1 
PROFIT_O: ordinal profit situation (1: very good, 2: good, 3: 
satisfactory, 4: bad, 5: very bad)  2.6851  1.0389  1  5 
 
Works council relations variables (reference group: no works council) 
Type 1: "mostly in line with management" (dummy)  0.07351 0.26101 0  1 
Type 2: "different opinion but with consensus" (dummy)  0.22970 0.42069 0  1 
Type 3: "different opinion without consensus" (dummy)  0.01065 0.10268 0  1 
 
Control variables 
Union bargained collective contract (dummy)  0.4941  0.5000  0  1 
Mainly foreign capital owner (dummy)  0.0712  0.2571  0  1 
Firm founded before the year 1990 (dummy)  0.5172  0.4998  0  1 
State of technology is alright (dummy)  0.2742  0.4462  0  1 
State of technology is new (dummy)  0.5152  0.4998  0  1 
State of technology is very new (dummy)  0.1784  0.3828  0  1 
Normal average working hours per week (hours)  39.1895 2.1619  15  60 
Employees unskilled for easy tasks (share)  0.1734  0.2437  0  1 
Employees with apprenticeships for qualified tasks (share)  0.6199  0.2458  0  1 
Employees with college degrees for qualified tasks (share)  0.0888  0.1595  0  1 
Apprentices (share)  0.0513  0.0709  0  0.5625 
Employees with part-time work (share)  0.1669  0.2144  0  1 
Employees with fixed-term contracts (share)  0.0445  0.1069  0  0.9745 
Female employees (share)  0.3192  0.2588  0  1 
Number of employees in June 2006  158.2924 791.6042 5  35019 
Notes: Number of firms in the complete estimation sample is 4693. 





Table 3: Impact on productivity, wages, and profit situation in complete sample 
  OLS coefficients  Binary probit 
marginal effects
Ordered probit 
coefficients  Marginal effects for ordered probit outcomes 
PROD  WAGE  PROFIT_G  PROFIT_O  Profit=1 Profit=2 Profit=3 Profit=4 Profit=5 
Type 1: "mostly in line with management"  0.1842***  0.1444***  0.0210  -0.0293  0.0048  0.0069  -0.0037  -0.0047  -0.0033 
(0.0468) (0.0187)  (0.0315)  (0.0655)  (0.0109) (0.0152) (0.0085) (0.0104) (0.0072) 
Type 2: "different opinion but with consensus"  0.3564***  0.1600***  -0.0607***  0.1095**  -0.0169**  -0.0266**  0.0127**  0.0177**  0.0131** 
(0.0351) (0.0153)  (0.0230)  (0.0477)  (0.0071) (0.0119) (0.0052) (0.0078) (0.0060) 
Type 3: "different opinion without consensus"  0.1412  0.2594***  -0.1401**  0.4011**  -0.0490***  -0.1057*  0.0271***  0.0659**  0.0618 
(0.1162) (0.0434)  (0.0691)  (0.1981)  (0.0174) (0.0547) (0.0025) (0.0318) (0.0392) 
Union bargained collective contract  -0.0352  -0.0002  0.0150  -0.0642* 0.0103*  0.0153* -0.0079* -0.0103* -0.0073* 
(0.0256) (0.0122)  (0.0176)  (0.0355)  (0.0057) (0.0084) (0.0044) (0.0057) (0.0041) 
Mainly foreign capital owner  0.1707***  0.0885***  0.0361 -0.0407 0.0067  0.0095 -0.0052 -0.0065 -0.0045 
(0.0454) (0.0167)  (0.0303)  (0.0704)  (0.0119) (0.0162) (0.0093) (0.0112) (0.0076) 
Firm founded before the year 1990  0.0525**  0.0450***  -0.0347*  0.0672*  -0.0108*  -0.0160*  0.0083*  0.0108*  0.0077* 
(0.0254) (0.0128)  (0.0179)  (0.0369)  (0.0060) (0.0088) (0.0046) (0.0059) (0.0042) 
State of technology is alright  0.0665  0.0959***  0.0062  -0.1282  0.0215  0.0297  -0.0168  -0.0203  -0.0140 
(0.0598) (0.0308)  (0.0448)  (0.0954)  (0.0166) (0.0214) (0.0131) (0.0149) (0.0100) 
State of technology is new  0.1814***  0.0985***  0.1145***  -0.3372***  0.0541***  0.0797***  -0.0408***  -0.0538***  -0.0392*** 
(0.0596) (0.0302)  (0.0435)  (0.0941)  (0.0152) (0.0220) (0.0111) (0.0149) (0.0113) 
State of technology is very new  0.2588***  0.1133***  0.1998***  -0.5383***  0.1082***  0.1020***  -0.0846***  -0.0784***  -0.0473*** 
(0.0645) (0.0323)  (0.0439)  (0.0996)  (0.0242) (0.0135) (0.0181) (0.0129) (0.0069) 
Normal average working hours  -0.0098  -0.0033  -0.0052  0.0121  -0.0020  -0.0029  0.0015  0.0019  0.0014 
(0.0077) (0.0036)  (0.0038)  (0.0082)  (0.0013) (0.0019) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0009) 
Employees unskilled for easy tasks  0.3682**  1.0316***  0.3003***  -0.5796*** 0.0933***  0.1378*** -0.0717*** -0.0930*** -0.0663*** 
(0.1516) (0.1006)  (0.1054)  (0.2030)  (0.0328) (0.0498) (0.0269) (0.0327) (0.0233) 
Employees with apprenticeships   0.7915***  1.4129***  0.3265***  -0.6636*** 0.1068***  0.1578*** -0.0821*** -0.1065*** -0.0759*** 
                   for qualified tasks  (0.1508)  (0.1015) (0.1052) (0.2037) (0.0329)  (0.0504) (0.0274) (0.0329) (0.0234) 
Employees with college degrees  1.5263***  2.1157***  0.4245***  -0.7829*** 0.1260***  0.1861*** -0.0969*** -0.1256*** -0.0896*** 
                   for qualified tasks  (0.1608)  (0.1024) (0.1130) (0.2168) (0.0351)  (0.0537) (0.0293) (0.0351) (0.0250) 
Apprentices -0.4605**  0.1176  0.3165**  -0.5205*  0.0838*  0.1238* -0.0644* -0.0835* -0.0596* 
(0.2094) (0.1283)  (0.1506)  (0.2962)  (0.0477) (0.0714) (0.0378) (0.0477) (0.0339) 18 
 
Employees with part-time work  -1.1755***  -0.9882***  -0.1973***  0.3833***  -0.0617***  -0.0911*** 0.0474*** 0.0615*** 0.0439*** 
(0.0770) (0.0435)  (0.0467)  (0.0899)  (0.0146) (0.0216) (0.0117) (0.0145) (0.0104) 
Employees with fixed-term contracts  -0.4959***  -0.0960*  0.1823** -0.3971** 0.0639**  0.0944** -0.0491** -0.0637** -0.0455** 
(0.1225) (0.0548)  (0.0732)  (0.1563)  (0.0252) (0.0372) (0.0196) (0.0251) (0.0180) 
Female employees  -0.1094*  -0.1558***  -0.0129  0.0272  -0.0044  -0.0065 0.0034 0.0044 0.0031 
(0.0607) (0.0311)  (0.0389)  (0.0795)  (0.0128) (0.0189) (0.0098) (0.0128) (0.0091) 
Number of employees in June 2006  -0.0000  0.0000  0.0001***  -0.0001 0.0000  0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0001)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Number of employees squared  0.0000  -0.0000  -0.0000***  0.0000**  -0.0000**  -0.0000**  0.0000**  0.0000**  0.0000** 
(0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Constant 10.7540***  6.5407*** 
(0.3684) (0.1874) 
Cut point 1  -1.6139*** 
(0.4139) 
Cut point 2  -0.3021 
(0.4134) 
Cut point 3  0.5965 
(0.4134) 
Cut point 4  1.3139*** 
(0.4139) 
Adjusted/Pseudo R²  0.3243  0.5998  0.0515  0.0261 
Notes: Number of firms in the complete estimation sample is 4693. All regressions include 9 industry dummies and 16 federal state dummies as further control variables. Reference group are 
firms without a works council. OLS is applied for productivity and wages (coefficients). Binary probit is applied for probability of at least good profit situation (marginal effects). Ordered probit 
is applied for ordered profit situation (coefficients and marginal effects for single outcomes). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients and marginal effects are statistical significant at 
* 10%, ** 5%, and ***1%. 





Table 4: Impact on productivity, wages, and profit situation in subsamples 
Complete sample (n=4693) 
PROD WAGE  PROFIT_G  PROFIT_O
Type 1: "mostly in line with management"  0.1842***  0.1444***  0.0210  -0.0293   
(0.0468) (0.0187) (0.0315)  (0.0655)     
Type 2: "different opinion but with consensus"  0.3564***  0.1600***  -0.0607***  0.1095** 
(0.0351) (0.0153) (0.0230)  (0.0477)     
Type 3: "different opinion without consensus"  0.1412  0.2594***  -0.1401**  0.4011** 
(0.1162) (0.0434) (0.0691)  (0.1981)     
Adjusted/Pseudo  R²  0.3243 0.5998 0.0515  0.0261     
Firms with 21 to 100 employees (n=1597) 
PROD WAGE  PROFIT_G  PROFIT_O
Type 1: "mostly in line with management"  0.2548***  0.1626***  0.0432  -0.0518   
(0.0676) (0.0276) (0.0474)  (0.0953)     
Type 2: "different opinion but with consensus"  0.2753***  0.1241***  -0.0925**  0.2093***
(0.0541) (0.0219) (0.0373)  (0.0789)     
Type 3: "different opinion without consensus"  -0.0307  0.2682***  -0.0158  0.1384   
(0.1855) (0.0993) (0.1278)  (0.2471)     
Adjusted/Pseudo  R²  0.2710 0.5509 0.0529  0.0276     
Firms without collective contracts (n=2374) 
PROD WAGE  PROFIT_G  PROFIT_O
Type 1: "mostly in line with management"  0.2364***  0.1390***  0.0114  0.0029   
(0.0793) (0.0312) (0.0588)  (0.1310)     
Type 2: "different opinion but with consensus"  0.2513***  0.1094***  -0.0976**  0.2194** 
(0.0652) (0.0270) (0.0416)  (0.0881)     
Type 3: "different opinion without consensus"  -0.1027  0.2243***  0.0782  -0.0144   
(0.2298) (0.0559) (0.1773)  (0.5018)     
Adjusted/Pseudo  R²  0.2947 0.5771 0.0537  0.0277     
Firms with collective contracts (n=2319) 
PROD WAGE  PROFIT_G  PROFIT_O
Type 1: "mostly in line with management"  0.1775***  0.1483***  -0.0061  0.0155   
(0.0602) (0.0242) (0.0395)  (0.0796)     
Type 2: "different opinion but with consensus"  0.3986***  0.1771***  -0.0726**  0.1178*  
(0.0448) (0.0207) (0.0302)  (0.0613)     
Type 3: "different opinion without consensus"  0.2005  0.2794***  -0.1999***  0.5325** 
(0.1370) (0.0520) (0.0733)  (0.2156)     
Adjusted/Pseudo  R²  0.3410 0.6144 0.0588  0.0303     
Notes: All regressions include the control variables also included in the estimates for the complete sample in Table 3. 
The results for the complete sample are summarized in the upper part of this table for comparison reasons. Reference 
group are firms without a works council. OLS is applied for productivity and wages (coefficients). Binary probit is 
applied for probability of at least good profit situation (marginal effects). Ordered probit is applied for ordered profit 
situation (coefficients). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients and marginal effects are statistical significant 
at * 10%, ** 5%, and ***1%. 
Source: IAB-Establishment Panel, 2006/2007 (controlled remote data access via FDZ); own computations. 
 